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Privacy and Health Information: The United States
and the European Union
Leslie Francis'
INTRODUCTION
Pandemics urgently remind us of the need for health information. Without
sufficiently accurate and comprehensive information, identification of disease
outbreaks may be delayed to the point that containment becomes far more difficult.
But the need for health information is not limited to contagious disease, the
original focus of public health surveillance. Health information is also critical for
the analysis and comparison of population health trends, for comparisons of cost
and quality of care, and for comparative assessments of treatment efficacy.
Information in patient records and other health information may also be crucial for
research on both existing and novel treatment modalities. Moreover, it may help us
understand the natural course of diseases or complex relationships between
genotypes and phenotypes. With large data sets of health information, it is also
possible to identify rare side effects of medication or drug interactions.
Although public health information is typically collected by entities that track
political jurisdictions, the need for such information transcends borders. In order to
identify and track disease outbreaks or other potential events of concern to public
health, data on an international scale may be crucial. Cross-border comparisons of
treatment costs, efficacy, or quality may prove illuminating. Especially for the
detection of less frequent events in subpopulations, data from more than one
jurisdiction may be required. If jurisdictions have significantly different legal
structures for data protection, however, the benefits of shared data may not be
attained.
The United States (US) and the European Union (EU) both have extensive
systems for the collection of health information that can be important for many
purposes. However, they have significantly different legal structures for data
protection. These differences are likely to persist or intensify if the EU finalizes
proposed changes to its data protection regime. This article describes the
differences between EU and US legal protections for health information. It urges
institutionalization of protections that allow both the EU and the US to share
health information in a manner consistent with their commitments to individual
privacy.
' Distinguished Alfred C. Emery Professor of Law and Distinguished Professor of Philosophy,
University of Utah.
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As described below, EU data protection rests primarily in the Charter of
Fundamental Rights and Freedom and with Directive 95/46/EC. The latter is
currently in the final stages of a revision process. Each member state has its own
data protection legal structure that must meet these over-arching requirements.
Data protection in the U.S. is far more fragmented, including the federal Privacy
Act for data possessed by the federal government, state data protection laws, the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) protections for
health information possessed by entities it covers, the Federal Trade Commission
prohibition of unfair or deceptive trade practices, and many other federal and state
laws involving different types of data or data holders. The focus in the discussion to
follow will be EU and US federal data protection laws, rather than the laws of the
various sub-jurisdictional units.
I. IDENTIFIABLE AND NON-IDENTIFIABLE HEALTH INFORMATION
On both sides of the Atlantic, data protection laws apply to information that
might identify individuals. For example, the EU Directive 95/46 defines "personal
data" as "any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person."2
In the United States, the HIPAA statute and accompanying rules apply to "health
information," that is, information that relates "to the past, present, or future
physical or mental health or condition of an individual; the provision of health care
to an individual; or the past, present, or future payment for the provision of health
care to an individual."' There are many reasons for the structure of HIPAA,
including the concerns about individual harm and respect for individual choice that
underlie the impetus for data protection.' An advantage of this structure is that
de-identified or never-identified information can be shared outside of the
requirements of jurisdictions' data protection laws.5
However, the distinction between identifiable and de-identified data is
increasingly difficult to implement in practice.' Some information-such as genetic
information, radiology scans, or cardiac tracings-may be unique to a particular
individual.' Even if proper de-identification procedures are followed, combinations
of data may permit identification of unique individuals to a high degree of
probability.' The advent of the "Internet of Things"-especially smart devices worn
2 Council Directive 95/46, art. 2(a), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 38 (EC).
45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2014).
See U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Human Subjects Research Protections: Enhancing
Protections for Research Subjects and Reducing Burden, Delay, and Ambiguity for Investigators, 76
Fed. Reg. 44,512, 44,513-14, 44,524 (July 26, 2011).
s See id. at 44,525.
6 See id. at 44,524.
7 Recognizing this, the proposal for changing the U.S. Common Rule for the protection of human
research subjects suggested treating all genetic information as identifiable. See id. at 44,526.
' See Melissa Gymrek et al., Identiffing Personal Genomes by Surname Inference, 339 SCI. 321,
324 (2013).
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on the person-may render anonymous collection of data increasingly a thing of
the past.9
Moreover, some of the benefits of data sharing can be realized with anonymous
or de-identified data, but many cannot. Identifiers are needed at some stage in the
process if records are to be linked reliably. If there is any reason to re-contact
individuals, for example, for contagious disease contact tracing or information
about identified health risks, identifiers will also be necessary. If information is to
be analyzed in such a way that it covers small areas or involves cells in which there
are very small numbers-as might be the case for rare conditions-inferences about
individuals may also be possible.
Significant controversy remains about the acceptable levels of risks of
re-identification and how these risks can be mitigated.'o Controversy also exists
about whether de-identification is sufficient protection even if it could be
implemented reliably." Labels applied to groups may stigmatize those groups, and
uses of de-identified data may be thought to violate the integrity of individuals
from whom the data were originally collected, even if they no longer can be
identified.' 2 These issues surrounding de-identification will remain even if practices
for the treatment of identifiable information are improved, but they are set aside for
the remainder of this discussion.
II. DATA PROTECTION LAW IN THE EU
The EU has both Union-wide and individual member state data protection
laws. At the level of the EU, overarching protections apply to all data types within
the scope of EU's power to regulate, power that remains limited under basic EU
law." The Lisbon Treaty requires the Union to respect the equality and national
identities of member states.' 4 It reserves specified functions to member states,
especially the function of national security but also the functions of ensuring the
territorial integrity of the state and maintaining law and order." The Treaty also
endorses the principle of subsidiarity, meaning that in areas not within its exclusive
competence, the Union acts only to the extent that the objectives of the proposed
' Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 8/2014 on the Recent Developments on the
Internet of Things, at 4, 14/EN, WP 223 (Sept. 16, 2014), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data
-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/201 4 /wp 2 2 3 _en.pdf
"o See generally Russ B. Altman et al., Data Re-Identification: Societal Safeguards, 339 SC. 1032,
1032-33 (2013) (acknowledging that re-identification is a problem for unique individuals and
advocating for increased regulatory measures); Gymrek et al., supra note 8, at 321-24 (reporting a study
of re-identification for American men).
n See generally Altman, supra note 10; Gymrek, supra note 8.
12 See, e.g., Mark A. Rothstein, Is Deidentification Sufficient to Protect Health Privacy in
Research?, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Sept. 1, 2010, at 3, 6-7.
1 See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 4, Sept. 5, 2008, 2008 OJ.
(C115) 18 [hereinafter Treaty of Lisbon].4 Id.
is See id. arts. 4-5.
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action cannot be sufficiently achieved by member states acting separately but
instead can be better achieved at Union level."
The fundamentals of EU data protection law are set out in the Charter of
Fundamental Rights.'" Effective in 2009, the Charter institutionalizes protection of
certain basic rights as a matter of fundamental EU law.'" Among these rights are
the Article 1 right to human dignity, the Article 3 right to the integrity of the
person including free and informed consent to medical interventions, the Article 6
right to liberty and security of the person, the Article 7 right to respect for private
and family life, and the Article 8 right to protection of personal data. 19 This last
right includes the general right to protection of personal data and the more specific
rights that personal data will be "processed fairly for specified purposes and on the
basis of the consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid
down by law."20 Article 8 also provides that everyone has the right to access data
about himself or herself and the right to rectification of data.' Compliance with
Article 8 must be subject to oversight by an independent authority.22
Directives under EU law set out basic requirements that member states must
implement in their national laws. Individual member states have considerable
latitude to determine how they will achieve compliance with a directive. Directive
95/46, adopted now almost twenty years ago, set out a framework for data
protection in order to further the free movement of information among EU
member states.23 The concern giving rise to the Directive was that member states
were increasingly unwilling to allow data transfers out of concerns that privacy
would not be adequately protected.24 Following the principle of subsidiarity, the
Directive requires all member states to determine the circumstances under which
the processing of personal data is lawful in accord with Directive requirements. 25
The Directive applies to all processing of personal data by automatic means or
by means of a filing system.26 Requirements of the Directive are applied to "data
controllers," who determine the purposes and means of collecting and processing
personal data, and to "data processors," entities processing data on behalf of
controllers. 27 Data controllers and processors may be natural persons, legal persons
such as corporations, or public entities.28
16Id. art. 5.
1 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 8, Dec. 18, 2000, 2000 O.J. (C364)
10 [hereinafter Charter of Fundamental Rights].
1 See generaly id. pmbl.
19 Id. arts. 1, 3, 6-8.
20 Id. art. 8, para. 1-2.
21 Id. para. 2.
' Id. para. 3.
23 See generay Council Directive 95/46, pmbl. ¶ 3,1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC).
24 See id. pmbl. 5.
25 Id. art. 5, at 39.
26 Id. art. 3(l).
27 See id. art. 2(d), (e), at 38.
28 Id.
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The Directive does not apply to the processing of personal data outside the
scope of EU law, including the processing of personal data for purposes of national
security, defense, or criminal law enforcement." It also does not apply to processing
by a natural person for household activities. 3 0 Member states must provide
exemptions for data processing carried out solely for journalism, artistic, or literary
expression, but "only if [these exemptions] are necessary to reconcile the right to
privacy with rules governing freedom of expression."3
The Directive requires EU member states to require that personal data must be
processed fairly and lawfully. Data must be collected for specified purposes.12 Data
must be kept in a form that allows identification of data subjects only for as long as
necessary for the intended purpose of the collection. 3 Processing is permissible
with the unambiguous consent of the data subject or if it is "necessary for the
performance of a contract" with the subject or for the fulfillment of a legal
obligation of the data processor.34 Processing without consent is also permissible
"to protect the vital interests of the data subject";35 this provision permits processing
of an individual's data for purposes of giving health care in an emergency, for
example. Consent is also not required for tasks "carried out in the public interest"
or for tasks carried out "in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller
or in a third party to whom the data are disclosed."36 These provisions permit data
processing for authorized public health purposes.
An important feature of the Directive is the special protections it provides for
categories of especially sensitive information. These categories include "data
revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical
beliefs, trade-union membership . . . health or sex life."" For data in these
categories, the subject's explicit consent to processing is required, with certain
exceptions." One relevant exception is that member states may prohibit processing
of sensitive data even with the subject's consent.39 Processing of sensitive data may
be permitted without consent if the "processing is necessary to protect the vital
interests of the data subject or of another person" or the data subject is incapable of
giving consent. 4 0 An example would be a public health authority processing
information needed to trace contacts of an Ebola patient where the patient is
unable to give consent. In addition, these special strictures on the processing of
sensitive data do not apply to processing by health care providers under national
" Id. art. 3(2), at 39.
30 Id.
a Id. art. 9, at 41.
32 Id. art. 6(1)(b), at 40.
3 Id. art. (6)(1)(e).
* Id. art. 7(a)-(c).
s Id. art. 7(d).
1 Id. art. 7(e).
37 Id. art. 8(1).
31 Id. art. 8(2)(a).
39 Id.
' Id. art. 8(2)(c).
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law "for the purposes of preventive medicine, medical diagnosis, the provision of
care or treatment or the management of health-care services.
A further provision of Directive 95/46/EC allows member states to create
special rules for the processing of data for scientific research. Although data
subjects have rights to information about whether data about them are being
processed and to request correction of processing that is not in accord with
Directive requirements,42 member states may restrict these rights in the case of
scientific research. 43 Restrictions require adequate legal safeguards, including that
the data not be used for decisions regarding particular individuals and that the
privacy of the data subject be protected."
Directive 95/46/EC also prohibits the transfer of data outside of the EU to any
jurisdiction that does not meet the EU's standards for an adequate level of
protection. 4 Because of the vast differences between their data protections,
concerns arose that the EU would consider US protections inadequate and thus
that it would be difficult to transmit data from the EU to the US. The solution has
been the establishment of a "safe harbor" by the US Department of Commerce.
Under the "safe harbor," an entity receiving data from the EU may self-certify that
it will process data according to EU standards.4 6 Failure to honor this certification
is considered a deceptive trade practice, subject to enforcement action by the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC).47
An additional area of tension in data policy between the EU and the US is data
transfers for law enforcement purposes. These transfers are outside of the scope of
Directive 95/46/EC. Since 2011, however, the EU and the US have been
negotiating an agreement to permit the flow of data for national security and law
enforcement purposes. In the aftermath of the revelations of the US PRISM
program, these negotiations continue to be stalled. A particular area that remains
unresolved concerns the rights of EU citizens to seek judicial redress for treatment
of their data in the US. For example, a EU citizen who has been erroneously
identified as a security risk might have data transferred to the US and then be
denied entry. That EU citizen would have rights to have the data corrected in the
EU, and it is the EU's position that the same rights should apply for the EU citizen
to seek correction in the US.48
1 Id. art. 8(3), at 41.
42 See id. art. 12, at 42.
43 Id. art. 13(2).
4 Id.
45 Id. art. 25, at 45-46. For exceptions to this parallel exception to the requirement of consent for
data processing, see id. art. 26, at 46.
* U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Welcome to the U.S.-EU Safe Harbor, EXPORT.GOV,
http://export.gov/safeharbor/eu/eg-main_018365.asp (last updated Apr. 11, 2012, 2:19 PM).
4 7 U.S. Dep't of Commerce, U.S.-EUSafe Harbor Overview, EXPORT.GOv, http://export.gov/safe
harbor/eu/egmain_- 018476.asp (last updated Dec. 18, 2013, 3:45 PM). See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012), for
the section of the Federal Trade Commission Act that prohibits unfair and deceptive trade practices.
4 Facrsheet EU-US: Negotiations on Data Protection, EUR. COMMISSION (June 2014),
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/files/factsheets/umbrella-factsheeten.pdf.
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In the years since the implementation of Directive 95/46/EC, technology has
changed enormously. At the time of the Directive's implementation, social
networking, cloud computing, and crowd sourcing had not been developed, and
even email was far different than it is today. The "internet of things"-smart
devices-is increasingly apparent.49 Other problems with Directive 95/46/EC have
also become increasingly apparent, including significant variations in
implementation among member states, confusion about the identification of data
controllers and processors, and tensions over the adequacy of the EU-US safe
harbor.
As a result, and after extensive study beginning in 2009, the EU has undertaken
to reform the Directive. so The reforms were proposed by the European
Commission in 2012 and adopted by a vote of the European Parliament in the
spring of 2014.s' They await final approval by the European Council of Ministers.5 2
There are some concerns that the approval process has stalled, however, and France
has recently urged strengthening plans for adoption.s" These proposed reforms
make many procedural and substantive changes that are relevant to health
information.
An initial procedural change is that the proposed reforms take the form of a
regulation rather than a directive. This means that member states will have less
flexibility than they currently enjoy in their implementation of Directive 95/46 and
thus there will be more uniform data protection rules across the EU. 54 An
important constraint does remain in that the principle of subsidiarity must continue
to be met. Importantly, the new EU regulation clearly will apply to any company
doing business within the EU, even if the data processing is actually performed
elsewhere, as with cloud storage.s
New substantive requirements include the implementation of reasonable
technical measures and organizational procedures for privacy by design.s 6 Measures
4 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 9, at 3-5. Many of these devices process
health information. Because the information is personally identifiable, it falls within the purview of
Directive 95/46/EC. Id.
s See Why Do We Need an EU Data Protection Reform?, EUR. COMMISSION,
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/review2012/factsheets/1_en.pdf (last visited Jan.
26, 2015); see also Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of
Such Data (General Data Protection Regulation), COM (2012) 11 final (Jan. 25, 2012),
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/review20l2/com_2012_11_en.pdf [hereinafter
Proposed Data Protection Regulation].
s See General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 50; see also Press Release, European
Comm'n, Progress on EU Data Protection Reform Now Irreversible Following European Parliament
Vote (Mar. 12, 2014), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseMEMO-14-186_en.htm.
52 Press Release, European Comm'n, supra note 51.
sa EU Urged to Enact Stalled Data Protection Laws as France Proposes New Measures, OUT
-LAw.coM (Sept. 23, 2014), http://www.out-law.com/en/articles/2014/september/eu-urged-to-enact-
stalled-data-protection-laws-as-france-proposes-new-measures/.
14See Monitoring the Application of Union Law, EUR. COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/eu_1aw/
introduction/what directive-en.htm (last updated Sept. 12, 2014).
s See Proposed Data Protection Regulation, supra note 50, art. 3(2), at 41.
s' Id. art. 23, at 56.
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such as privacy-protective default settings would be required. The proposed
Regulation stipulates that the data controller bears the burden of proving the data
subject's consent to processing for specific purposes; consent must be presented in a
manner that is distinguishable from any other written materials provided along
with it."7
Another quite high-profile substantive change is the inclusion of the "right to
be forgotten" in the Regulation.5 8 A version of this right was applied by the
European Court of Justice in its 2014 decision involving the Spanish data
protection authority's request that Google eliminate links in a search for a private
citizen's name to a newspaper's publication of a record of his long-ago resolved
debt. 5 Implementation of this decision remains controversial, however. Search
engines such as Google have posted forms for individuals to use to request erasure,
which is really delisting the links from the search rather than full erasure of the
data.60 Google reported over 150,000 requests by the fall of 2014, of which it
granted 41.6%.61 News organizations such as the BBC have in response decided to
publish a continually updated list of all granted requests, asserting that some of the
articles have been wrongfully removed and the public's right to know compromised
as a result.62
Personal data concerning health information command a separate article in the
Regulation. Under Article 81, the processing of personal health data must be
necessary for one of the following reasons:
(a) the purposes of preventive or occupational medicine, medical diagnosis, the
provision of care or treatment or the management of health-care services, and
where those data are processed by a health professional subject to the obligation
of professional secrecy or another person also subject to an equivalent obligation
of confidentiality under Member State law or rules established by national
competent bodies; or
(b) reasons of public interest in the area of public health, such as protecting
against serious cross-border threats to health or ensuring high standards of quality
and safety, inter alia for medicinal products or medical devices; or
(c) other reasons of public interest in areas such as social protection, especially in
order to ensure the quality and cost-effectiveness of the procedures used for
settling claims for benefits and services in the health insurance system."
s Id. art. 7(1)-(2), at 45.
5 Id. art. 17, at 52-53.
" Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espafiola de Protecci6n de Datos (AEPD) (E.C.J.
May 13, 2014), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document print.jsf>dodang=EN&docid=152065.
' Search Removal Request Under Data Protection Law in Europe, GOOGLE,
https://support.google.comlegal/contact/lr-eudpa?product=websearch (last visited Jan. 26, 2015).
61 Transparency Report: European Privacy Requests for Search Removals, GOOGLE,
http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/europeprivacy/ (last visited Jan. 26, 2015).
62 Dave Lee, BBC to Publish 'Right to be Forgotten'Removals List, BBC NEWS (Oct. 17, 2014),
http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-29658085.
63 Proposed Data Protection Regulation, supra note 50, art. 81(1)(a)-(c), at 95.
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The Regulation also makes explicit that processing of personal data for
historical, statistical, or scientific research purposes is lawful, subject to specified
conditions and safeguards found in Article 83.' Under these Article 83 safeguards,
personal data may be processed only if these research purposes cannot be otherwise
fulfilled by processing data that does not permit, or no longer permits, the
identification of the data subject.6 s The safeguards also include separation of
identifiers to the extent that research purposes permit.6 6 Health information may be
processed for historical, statistical or scientific research, subject to these safeguards;
an example is the compilation of patient registries to improve diagnosis and
treatment of specific conditions.6 7
Finally, the Regulation codifies the right to be forgotten and to erasure. 6' The
right applies when the data are no longer needed for their purpose, the data subject
withdraws consent and there is no other legal basis for processing, the data subject
objects to the use of the information for marketing, or the data processing violates
the regulation in some other way.69 This right does not apply to the processing of
data for historical, statistical, or scientific research in accord with the Regulation.o
As approval for the proposed new Regulation has proceeded, some research and
public health entities have voiced significant interpretive concerns. One concern is
the likely scope of the public interest exceptions, especially for biomedical and
public health research.7' Another concern is that if the Regulation is interpreted
narrowly, it may hamper efforts to monitor population health.7 2 Still another
concern is that increased harmonization-one of the goals of the reform-will
undermine more effective data protection regimes already in place in some EU
member states, especially Scandinavian countries."
Another important area of discussion about the new Regulation will be its
impact on transfers of data between the EU and the US. The Regulation makes
clear the importance of ensuring that transfers beyond the EU are to jurisdictions
that meet EU standards.74 There are calls within the EU for reconsideration of the
6 Id. art. 6(2), at 44.
6s Id. art. 83(1)(a), at 96.
66 Id. art. 83(1)(b).
6
1 Id. art. 81(2), at 95.
" Id. art. 17, at 51.
69 Id. art. 17(1).
70 Id. art. 17(2)(c).
71 See, e.g., Yves Coppieters & Alain Leveque, Ethics, privacy and the legal framework governing
medical data: opportunities or threats for biomedical and public health research, 71 ARCHIVES OF PUB.
HEALTH, no. 15, 2013, at 1; M. Stenbeck & P. Allebeck, "Do the planned changes to European data
protection threaten or facilitate important health research?" EurfPublic Health 2011, 21(6): 682-3.
72 Carinci F, Di Iorio CT, Ricciardi W, Klazinga N, Verschuuren M. "Revision of the European
Data Protection Directive: opportunity or threat for public health monitoring?" Eur J Public
Health 2011, 21(6): 684-5.
' Hakulinen T, Arbyn M, Brewster DH, Coebergh JW, Coleman MP, Crocetti E, Forman D,
Gissler M, Katalinic A, Luostarinen T, Pukkala E, Rahu M, Storm H, Sund R, Tornberg S,
Tryggvadottir L. "Harmonization may be counterproductive-at least for parts of Europe where public
health research operates effectively." EurJPubc Health 2011, 21(6): 686-7.
7 Proposed Data Protection Regulation, supra note 50, arts. 40-42, at 69-71
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US-EU safe harbor doctrine in the aftermath of Wikileaks. Indeed, the
Commissioner-designate for the Digital Internal Market, Andrus Ansip, recently
stated, "Safe Harbour is not secure. The Agreement has yet to live up to its
name."" Ansip also asserted in the hearing that unless the US provides more
specific conditions in its escape clause for national security, the EU should consider
suspending the Safe Harbour Agreement."6
III. DATA PROTECTION LAW IN THE US
Data protection law in the US is far more fragmented than in the EU.n In the
US, privacy protections differ based on the type of entity holding information, the
type of information, and the jurisdiction."
Health information is subject to a wide variety of federal and state laws. The
Privacy Act of 1974 protects identifiable information possessed by the federal
government." Federal law also provides some additional protections for special
types of data such as census dataso or certain statistical information." Information
possessed by state governments comes under the protection of each state's privacy
and freedom of information act laws. These laws may permit the disclosure of at
least some identifiable information, as when a newspaper in southern Illinois
sought cancer registry data to investigate allegations of a cancer cluster caused by
exposure to environmental toxins. 82
The primary US statute governing health information possessed by health care
providers and payers is the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA).83 This statute also applies to business associates possessing identifiable
health information under contract with the primary entities it covers, such as
vendors of electronic medical records systems. 4 It does not, however, apply to the
myriad forms of apps or internet sites possessing health information, from personal
health record providers to fitness apps to social networking sites such as Facebook
or search engines such as Google. These non-HIPAA covered entities are governed
instead by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act prohibition on unfair or
75 Ansip Threatens to Suspend Safe Harbour Data Agreement with US, EURACTIV (Jan. 8, 2015,
3:45 PM), http://www.euractiv.com/sections/innovation-enterprise/ansip-threatens-suspends-safe-harb
our-data-agreement-us-308962.
76 Id.
n See Robert M. Gellman, Fragmented, Incomplete, and Discontinuous: The Failure of Federal
Privacy Regulatory Proposals and Institutions, 6 SOFTWARE L.J. 199, 238 (1993).
7 See id.
7 See 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2012).
so 13 U.S.C. § 9 (2012).
s' 44 U.S.C. § 3501 (2012).
82 S. Illinoisan v. Ill. Dep't of Pub. Health, 844 N.E.2d 1, 2-3 (Ill. 2006). Despite evidence of the
possibility of re-identification of individuals because of the small numbers of affected individuals with
particular cancers, the Illinois court held that the state's Freedom of Information Act required disclosure
of the cancer registry information.
8 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat.
1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).
* 45 C.F.R. § 164.504(e) (2014).
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deceptive trade practices.15 In recent years, the FTC has brought actions against
both HIPAA-covered entities and non-HIPAA covered entities for violating this
prohibition. Examples include the settlement involving CVS Caremark for
improper disposal of prescription labels" and the recent action against LabMD for
allowing sensitive health information to be exposed to a file-sharing network and to
identity theft."
HIPAA, despite frequent assumptions to the contrary, was not primarily
intended as an information protection statute. Its primary goals were to further the
portability of health insurance and to streamline health insurance transactions. The
Security Rule and the Privacy Rule implement HIPAA. The Privacy Rule is
distinguishes between uses and disclosures of protected health information for
which patient authorization is required and uses and disclosures that do not require
authorization." There is also a small category of types of uses and disclosures that
require giving patients an opportunity to object, such as a listing of the names and
room numbers of patients admitted to a hospital or the sharing of health
information in the patient's presence with persons involved in the patient's care.8 9
A major category of uses and disclosures that do not require patient
authorization is treatment, payment, and health care operations (including quality
improvement and analytics of cost-effectiveness).90 Uses and disclosures for health
care operations are subject to what is called the "minimum necessary" standard."
This provision of HIPAA is somewhat parallel to the proposed EU Regulation
Article 81's treatment of health information for health care, although it extends
more broadly and does not explicitly contain the EU's confidentiality
requirement.92
A second category of uses and disclosures that are permissible without patient
authorization is uses and disclosures for public health purposes as required by law."
Once information has been transferred to public health authorities under this
category, it is no longer under HIPAA protections.94 This requirement is the
parallel to the proposed EU regulation Article 81's disclosure for public health
surveillance. 9s The HIPAA provision, however, leaves open to state legislatures
decisions about what uses and disclosures they will enact for public health purposes.
s See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012).
* Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, CVS Caremark Settles FTC Charges: Failed to Protect
Medical and Financial Privacy of Customers and Employees; CVS Pharmacy Also Pays 52.25 Million
to Settle Allegations of HIPAA Violations (Feb. 18, 2009), http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press
-releases/2009/02/cvs-caremark-settles-ftc-chargesfailed-protect-medical-financial.
" Complaint at 3-5, LabMD, Inc., File No. 1023099 (Fed. Trade Comm'n Aug. 28, 2013) (No.
9357), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/08/1308291abmdpart3.
pdf.
" 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a) (2014).
89 45 C.F.R. § 164.510 (2014).
* 45 C.F.R. § 164.501, 506 (2014).
" 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(b) (2014).
92 Proposed Data Protection Regulation, supra note 50, art. 81, at 95.
9 45 C.F.R. § 164.512 (2014).
94 d.
9 See Proposed Data Protection Regulation, supra note 50, art. 81, at 95.
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States may strike a variety of balances between the protection of individual
privacy and access to information by the public. A particularly noteworthy example
of a state striking the balance against privacy in favor of the public's right to know
is Illinois. The Illinois Supreme Court required the disclosure of state cancer
registry data with cell numbers sufficiently small (a diagnosis of neuroblastoma,
together with the date of diagnosis and zip code of the patient's residence) so that
re-identification was possible by an expert.9' In reaching this conclusion, the
Illinois Supreme Court interpreted the statutory language of its Freedom of
Information Act, and found that "tends to lead to the identity of' referred to what
ordinary individuals might be able do and not to the abilities of technologically
sophisticated experts.17
HIPAA also allows the use or disclosure of protected health information for
law enforcement purposes, a potentially open-ended provision not subject to the
minimum necessary standard. " This provision also opens the possibility of
extensive transfers of health information of the sort objected to by many in the EU
after Wikileaks."
For research, HIPAA allows use of what is termed a limited data set of health
information without patient authorization. 00 This is a data set that has been
stripped of most identifiers, except some dates and locations;'0 ' these data sets may
permit more robust analyses than de-identified data, although they may not allow
sufficiently accurate linking of records. HIPAA also permits the use of identifiable
health information in research, if there is an Institutional Review Board or privacy
board waiver of authorization based on a finding that the research could not
practicably be carried out without the waiver and that patient privacy will be
protected adequately.1 02 Otherwise, HIPAA requires patient authorization for the
use of the health information that it covers in research. Tensions between these
HIPAA requirements and the federal Common Rule used by many federal
agencies to govern research with human subjects are notorious0 3 and have led to
proposals to amend the Common Rule."0 ' These proposals have not as of yet been
acted on, however. In comparison to proposed EU Regulation Article 83's
provisions governing use of health information for historical, statistical, or research
purposes, these US requirements are impressively cumbersome.
9 S. Illinoisan v. Ill. Dep't of Pub. Health, 844 N.E.2d 1, 18-21 (Ill. 2006).
97 id.
9 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(b), 512 (2014).
" See James D. Nordin et al., Bioterrorism Surveillance and Privacy. Intersection of HIPAA, the
Common Rule, and Public Health Law, 98 AM.J. PUB. HEALTH 802, 804-06 (2008), for a proposal to
integrate privacy protections in the use of health information for bioterrorism surveillance.
1o 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(e)(1) (2014).
o 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(e)(2) (2014).
102 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(i) (2014).
103 E.g., INST. OF MED., BEYOND THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE: ENHANCING PRIVACY,
IMPROVING HEALTH THROUGH RESEARCH 25 (2009).
10 U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., ANPRM for Revision to Common Rule, HHS.GOV,
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/anprm2011page.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2014).
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Like the EU, the US is thus considering at least some revisions to its regulatory
structure governing the use of health information. However, consideration appears
to be limited to the interplay between HIPAA and the federal regulations
governing research with human subjects, at least at present. And it remains unclear
if, or when, the Department of Health and Human Services will issue a notice of
proposed rulemaking about revisions to the research rules; the advance notice was
issued in 201110 and a notice of proposed rule-making had not been issued as of
this Article's publication. Moreover, US privacy law is so fragmented in comparison
with EU law, in terms of both jurisdictions and subject matter, that it appears
unlikely that more comprehensive changes will occur at least in the next few years.
IV. CONCLUSION: TOWARDS MORE EFFECTIVE AND
INTEGRATED USES OF DATA FOR HEALTH
Many important public health, health research, and treatment goals can be
furthered by the use of health information. Privacy protection, as the EU
recognizes, is an important aspect for facilitating the use and transfer of this
information. All too often, privacy is seen as a barrier to information use, but
without adequate assurances that data will be safeguarded appropriately, there are
risks that data will not be shared at all.o6 Providing such assurances is a primary
impetus for the EU's revision of its current data protection law.
As the EU moves towards adopting and implementing its proposed regulatory
changes, it will be important to monitor the impacts on public health and medical
research both within and beyond the borders of its member states. For the US, one
concern will be whether the EU's increasingly stringent privacy protections will
require revision of the safe harbor framework. There may also be growing
divergence between the EU's overarching approach to the protection of personal
information and the US's segmented approach that imposes very different
restrictions on information within and outside of the HIPAA rules. Those
interested in the responsible use of health information in the US might be well
advised to watch how the EU's proposed Regulation plays out in the treatment of
health information, especially the implementation of the provisions of Articles 81
and 83 governing the use of information for public health, improvement of health
care, and medical research.
105 Id.
"n Letter from Larry A. Green, Chairman, Natl Comm. on Vital & Health Statistics, to Kathleen
Sebelius, Sec'y, Dep't of Health & Human Servs. (Dec. 5, 2012), available at http://www.ncvhs.hhs.gov
/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/1212051t.pdf.
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